Search results for "English auction"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost-reducing Innovation*
2001
In the context of a Cournot duopoly, this paper studies the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by means of three possible allocation mechanisms: auction, fixed fee, and direct negotiation. Once the use of an arbitrary reserve price (which is not credible) has been excluded, it is no longer true that auction always yields higher profit to the patentee than a fixed fee. However, the authors propose a direct negotiation mechanism which restores the patentee’s profit to the level of an auction with an arbitrary reserve price (which is unimplementable). Direct negotiation is superior to both an auction with a nonarbitrary reserve price and a fixed fee. From the social point of view, however…
Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results
2015
Abstract In a set of human experiments, we analyze the impact of the buyer׳s reserve price policy in an online open outcry reverse auction. We measure the impact of revealing or not the reserve price on the buyer׳s expected cost when suppliers may be risk-averse. Results confirm that the optimal public reserve price policy dominates for the buyer when the lowest cost supplier is weakly risk-averse but in contrast with theory, the secret reserve price policy does not dominate when he becomes very risk-averse. Analysis of strategic suppliers׳ bidding behavior shows, in conformity with theory, that they react to the secret reserve price and are more aggressive when they are more risk-averse. T…
Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
2010
We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders incur private costs to participate to the auction. Supposing that valuations for target firm are common knowledge, we study the optimal strategy of bidders and analyze the takeover result when they get or not toeholds in the target firm. We found that bidder's decision of participation is endogenous. By analyzing bidder's condition of participation, we found that the probability that the potential bidder with the highest valuation will not participate to the control, exists. We show that this probability increases with the size of toeholds possessed by the bidder with low valuation. Nevertheless, the size of toeholds possessed by the bidd…